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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEMAR s. WINEGAR and
LEGRAND WINEGAR,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs-

CASE NO. 15504

SMITH INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action arises out of a dispute concerning the
interpretation of a lease and the plaintiffs' failure to
exercise a lapsed option to renew the lease for an additional
term.

Plaintiff's Complaint prays for a declaratory judgment

interpreting the renewal provisions of the lease, for a
reformation of the lease pursuant to such judgment and
damages resulting from the alleged failure of the defendant
to consent to an assignment of the lease.

Defendant's

position is that the attempt to exercise the option was not
timely made and seeks attorney's fees under the terms of the
lease.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury and the trial court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

entered a judgment against the plaintiffs on the plaintiffs'
Complaint and each of the causes therein.

The t ria
· 1 court

did, however, enter judgment in conformance with the plaintiffs'

Fourth Cause of Action relative to the removal of the

improvements and carwash facilities located on the leasehold
premises and made an order for reasonable attorney's fees

(R. 62) to defendant.
Plaintiffs' motion to amend the findings of fact

a~

conclusions of law was heard and the defendant's motion for
an order fixing the amount of
at that time.

attorney's fees was also heard

Plaintiffs' motions were denied, and the

defendant's motion for fixing the amount of the attorney's
fees was taken under advisement (R. 81).

On November 4, 1977

the plaintiffs obtained a stay of the imposition of the
court's judgment pending this appeal

(R.

8 5) •

The matter of

fixing the amount of defendant's attorney's fees has never
been ruled on by the trial court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment of no cause
of action on their Complaint, but do not seek reversal of the
judgment of the court pertaining to the right of the plaintiffs to remove the improvements and carwash facilities from
the leasehold property upon the termination of the lease.
· · g of
Defendant resists the appeal and reserves the f ixin

the amount of attorney's fees for the fl..nal remittitur of
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the case to the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is the owner of property located at 9200 South
700 East in Sandy, Utah.

Plaintiffs are assignees of a

lease for a car wash pursuant to an assignment from William
and Elithe Doxey executed on August 21, 1972.

The original

lessess of the property were Virgil and Thelma Fox, who
subsequently assigned their interest to the Doxeys (R. 142-43).

A copy of the Lease is found, R. 7 to 10, and the Amendment
to Lease, R. 11-12.
Pursuant to paragraphs four and six of the Lease, the
original lessees took the leasehold as unimproved property
for the purposes of constructing and operating a carwash
thereon.

At the time that the Foxes assigned the leasehold

interest to the Doxeys, the carwash had already been erected
and the Doxeys acquired the carwash business, improvements and
facilities from the Foxes.
On the 9th of January, 1969, the Doxeys executed with
the defendant an Amendment to Lease (R. 11 and 12 and 144).
This Amendment to Lease lies at the heart of the dispute now
before the Court.
The Amendment was at the request of the Doxeys, but was
originally drafted by Mr. Reed M. Smith (R. 144).

However,

three changes in the drafted Amendment were made by interlineation in the presence of Mr. Doxey and at his request.
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Mr.

Smith is, and at all times relevant herein was, the

President of Smith Investment Company (R. 247).

The amend-

ment to the lease originally set forth an enlarged lease
period of eight years.

The calculation of the eight-year
~

period was to be from the 15th day of February, 1967.

the 9th of January, 1969, when Mr. Doxey met with Mr. Smith
to execute the amendment, several interlineations were made
on the amending document whereby the term of eight years was
changed to a term of ten years

(R. 145), but further down in

the language of the paragraph relating to the term of the lea:
there is a provision relative to the giving of notice of an
intention to renew.

The eight-year period referred to

therein was not changed by interlineation (R. 152).

No

request was made for changing that period for renewal (R. m1
The relevant amended provision is quoted below for the
convenience of the Court.

The word enclosed in brackets is

the portion of the agreement which was crossed out by the
parties to insert the word "ten."
2.
TERM.
The term of this lease shall be for
a period of ten (eight) years commencing on the.
15th day of February, 1967, as hereinafter i;irovided,
with a right of renewal for an additional five
years upon condition that notice of intention to
renew is given by the Lessees to the Lessor at. least
three months prior to the expiration of said eightyear period, and upon the further condition that the
rent for the renewal period shall be $200.00 per
month.
e Lease an6
When the plaintiffs took an assignment o f th
· cludin°

the Amendment to Lease, they read the documents, in
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·

the provision for the eight-year term on the right of renewal
(R. 189).

This assignment was taken by plaintiffs from

their brother-in-law, Mr. Doxey, and at no time did plaintiffs
make inquiry of defendant as to any alleged ambiguity or
lack of understanding of the eight-year period for the renewal
right.
The lease term as provided by the Amendment to Lease
was for ten years, commencing February 15, 1967, and hence
would expire February 14, 1977.

The right of renewal for

an additional five years is "upon condition that notice of
intention is given by the Lessees to the Lessor at least
three months prior to the expiration of said eight-year period."
So the deadline for giving notice was December 14, 1974.
Actual notice was not given until August 20, 1976.
The plaintiffs requested a consent to an assignment of
the Lease to Mr. Jensen (R. 165, and plaintiffs' Exhibit 8).
In response to the request of the plaintiffs, Mr. Smith
wrote a letter to the Winegars dated March 22, 1976, offering
a conditional consent to the assignment of the lease (plaintiffs'
Exhibit 9).

The precise language of the letter is as follows:

We will not withhold our consent to an
assignment when the repair and maintenance work
is completed and providing we receive financial
statements and information to qualify the people
that you are proposing as our new lessees.
The

Winegars undertook some repairs to satisfy

its terms, which consisted principally of painting of the
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

buildings, repair of the asphalt, replacement of shingles
on the roof of the building, and repair of the sign advertising the carwash (R. 166), all of which could be considered
routine maintenance pursuant to the terms of the lease, but
which had been neglected by plaintiffs.
A financial statement of Mr. Ivan Jensen was mailed
to the defendant as an enclosure with plaintiffs' Exhibit No.
10.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10 was mailed on June 10, 1976, by

certified mail and was received by the defendant (R. 169).
This letter also contained the plaintiffs' notice that all
of the repairs and maintenance work required by the conditional consent had been completed.
In contemplation of the purchase of the carwash and an
assignment of the lease, Jr. Jensen paid a down payment of
$5,000 to the plaintiffs as a portion of the purchase pr~e

(R. 176).

The total contract price was $20,000.

Short~

after the time of the listing of the property by Mr. Jensen,
the defendant refused to execute a consent to the assignment
of the lease, because such included an acknowledgment of the
validity of the notice of intention to renew the lease asg~
by plaintiffs in August of 1976, 20 months after the required
date.
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' TWENTY-MONTH DELINQUENCY IN
ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF RENEWAL
BLOCKS ANY RECOVERY IN THIS ACTION BY PLAINTIFFS.
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POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT
EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT.
POINT III
THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT TO LEASE
SETTING EIGHT YEARS AS THE RENEWAL
PERIOD, ARE CLEAR AND NOT PATENTLY AMBIGUOUS.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS TOOK AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE LEASE
AND AMENDMENT TO LEASE FROM THEIR
BROTHER-IN-LAW AFTER READING THE SAME AND
WITHOUT MAKING INQUIRY OF DEFENDANT, THEREBY
ACKNOWLEDGING THE UNA.t\IBIGUOUS NATURE OF THE
LANGUAGE.
POINT V.
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH GROUNDS FOR
REFORMATION OF THE LEASE OR AMENDMENT TO
LEASE.
POINT VI.
THE COURT SHOULD NOT REWRITE THE LEASE AND
AMENDMENT TO THE LEASE TO SATISFY PLAINTIFFS AND RELIEVE THEM FROM THEIR FAILURE
TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF INTENTION TO
RENEW.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' TWENTY-MONTH DELINQUENCY IN
ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF RENEWAL
BLOCKS ANY RECOVERY IN THIS ACTION BY
PLAINTIFFS.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.AND FINDINGS
OF FACT.
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The evidence is without dispute that plaintiffs made
no attempt to exercise the five-year renewal right set forth
in the Amendment to Lease,

until August 20, 1976.

This

date is over eighteen months beyond the deadline of F e b ruary
15, 1975

(eight years from February 15, 1967).

Thus the

failure to exercise the right to renew within the eight-year
period granted by the Amendment wholly eliminated that
conditional option for renewal.
This Court has consistently held that where a time is
fixed for exercise of an option to renew a lease on realty
or to purchase realty, that time stated is binding.

Unless

the notice of intent to exercise such option is timely given,
the option right expires and is lost.

The most recent of

these decisions is J.R. Stone Company v. Keate (March 3,
19 7 8) .

This was a lease with an option to purchase.

Here

the attempted exercise of the option was upon terms different
from the option right.

The decision in part says:

The law requires that one who desires to exercise an option must do so in accordance with its
terms;
and where there is a substantial variance
between the terms of the option and the offer to
exercise it, the latter amounts only to a counter
offer, which the optionor is at liberty to acc~pt.
or to reject.
From what has been said abc;ive :t. 1 ~
plainly apparent that the trial court was JUSt1fie
in its finding that the plaintiff was ready and
willing to deliver the proper conveyance upon performance of the conditions of the option by the
defendant Keate, but that the latter did not make a
valid exercise of the option.
In Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P. 2d 356 •
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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relief was sought by way of specific performance on an
option for sale and purchase of realty.

The time period

set was June 9, 1966 to January 31, 1967, which was
extended to July 30, 1967.
until October 2, 1967.

No tender of payment was made

Relief was denied and this Court

affirmed and said:
If an option contract provides for payment
of all or a portion of the purchase price in
order to exercise the option, the optionee, to be
entitled to a conveyance, must not only accept the
offer but pay or tender the agreed amount within
the prescribed time.
Aiken v. Less Taylor Motor Co., 110 Utah 265,
171 P. 2d 676, directly considered an option to renew a
lease.

The lease period was October 1, 1941 to September

30, 1943, with a four-year renewal of lease option.

This

recited, "Lessee hereby agrees to give Lessor 60 day notice
before expiration of Lease, if not renewed .

"

It is elementary that an option to renew
contained in a lease must be exercised to effect
the renewal.
Usually affirmative acts are required
either by the express terms of the lease or by
implication of law to exercise the option to renew.
We opine the parties intended that if no notice
were given 60 days before the end of the two year
period, the option to renew was thereby exercised
and the lease was thus renewed.
In this exceptional case, failure to do anything during the
60 day period constituted exercise of the option due to
the unique language.

But the time period was controlling.

As stated by the Court, it is elementary that "an option to
renew contained in a lease must be exercised to effect
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the renewal."
As in most cases and in the Amendment to Lease now
before the Court, affirmative action within a stated

ti~

limit must be taken, otherwise the option to renew lapses.
This rule was earlier defined by this Court in I.X.L.
Furniture v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279, where, in a
lease for two years ending December 1, 1906, Lessee overlooked the requirement ;for exercising the right to renew "a:
the expiration of the term", but made a request on December
3, 1906, three days late.

Relief was sought on the grounds

of inadvertence and the equitable rule seeking to prevent ti
fei tures.

The trial court denied the requested extension

and the Supreme Court affirmed.

On the plea for equitable

relief the Court said:
Finally, it is claimed that the contract
should be construed and applied most strongly
against respondents under the equity rule, which
seeks to prevent forfeitures, and that the acts
of appellant in seeking a renewal should be favorably considered in its behalf for the same reason.
But the rule contended for has no application to
the facts in this case.
No forfeiture is involved.
Appellant, at most, lost nothing but an opportun~ty
by not performing a condition required of it, which
was necessary to the enjoyment of a right to an
additional term, and which was to be paid for when
obtained.
If a man is invited to attend a sale, of
his neighbor's property at a certain time,.and. 1 s d
given the right of bidding for and purchasing it, an
fails to attend the sale at the hour fixed, hem~
miss an opportunity, but he forfeits nothing. 5° 0 f
here, appellant simply lost the right to a renewa 1
a new term.
He forfeited nothing in the legal sense
that that term is used to respondents.
-10-
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In the present case before the court, the plaintiffs
either did not read or misread the figure provision as to the
time for the exercise of the option to renew.

At no time

did they mention a desire to renew and extend the lease or
formally seek to exercise such right, until nearly two years
after the end of the eight-year term for exercise of the
option.

The court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law (R. 59-62, paragraph 6) specifically found "Plaintiffs
did not give notice to the defendant of an intention to renew
the lease three months prior to the expiration of said eightyear period from February 15, 1967, and plaintiffs were
advised by defendant that their right to renew had expired."
Then in paragraph 7 of the Findings the court found: "Defendant
has done nothing to estop itself from realizing upon and
enforcing the terms of the lease and said amendment."
In consequence of said Findings, the court then
entered its Judgment that the lease terminated on February 14,

1977 and it is entitled to immediate possession of the premises.
Said Findings and Judgment are supported by clear and competent
evidence.

At no time did the defendant manifest any intent

to change the option period beyond the eight years stated in
the amendment to the lease, nor did defendant or its officers
at any time represent otherwise to plaintiffs or to their
predecessors in ownership of the said lease.
POINT III
THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT TO LEASE
-11-
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SETTING EIGHT YEARS AS THE RENEWAL PERIOD,
ARE CLEAR AND NOT PATENTLY AYillIGUOUS.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFFS TOOK AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE LEASE
AND AMENDMENT TO LEASE FROM THEIR BROTHERIN LAW AFTER READING THE SAME AND WITHOUT
MAKING INQUIRY OF DEFENDANT, HEREBY
ACKNOWLEDGING THE UNAMBIGUOUS NATURE OF
THE LANGUAGE.
For the plaintiffs to succeed in the law suit and

t~

appeal before this court, they must somehow convince the
court that the amendment to the lease is patently ambiguous,
or that the same should be reformed to comply with plaintiffs' present asserted basis that a ten-year option
was intended.

~rm

We will deal first in this section of the

brief with the issue of whether or not the lease was patenti
ambiguous,

so as to afford to the plaintiffs a basis for

placing oral evidence in the record to show an intent other
than that set forth in the document; or, assuming that the
·
"bl e, t h at the pla1nt1
·
·ff s di'd prove that'
ev1"d ence was perm1ss1
there was a mutual mistake or some such other basis upon wh::
the court could predicate a change of the lease.

The langua:

of the Amendment to Lease is before the court, and particula:.
•

i t is Exhibit B attached to the plaintiffs' Complaint
Mr. and Mrs.

(R 11-J

··

Doxey at that time were taking an assignment of

the earlier lease of November 30, 1966 between defendant anc
·
·1
V1rg1

c.

and T h e l ma J. Fox.

The car wash had been erected

nd the ooxe•'
upon defendant's property and was in operation a
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desired

that the original lease, which was from February

15, 1967 for a term of five years, be made a ten-year lease.
The testimony is clear that at that time the defendant,
through its President, Mr. Reed M. Smith, was requested to
prepare an amendment to the lease so as to allow such an
extension of the term.

This he did, and the amendment to the

lease as drafted and presented for Mr. Doxey's signature
provided for a term of eight years, commencing on the 15th
day of February, 1967.

When they met for the signing of this

document (1969) they requested that it be for
years because two years had already passed.

a full ten
Mr. Smith agreed

to this, and there and then, in the presence of each other
and at the request of Mr. Doxey, the words "eight years" in
the second line was changed
writing over it "ten".

by crossing out "eight" and

Then in the next paragraph relating

to rental the word "eight" was crossed out and the word "ten"
inserted, and further down, where it referred to the sixth,
seventh and eighth years, there was added ninth and tenth.
Thus the term of the lease by the amendment was extended for
ten years from February 15, 1967.
The original lease had contained a five-year right of
renewal, and thus in the amendment to lease a right of renewal
was stated as follows:

"With a right of renewal for an

additional five years upon condition that notice of intention
to renew is given by lessees to the lessor at least three
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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months prior to the expiration of said eight-year period."
Plaintiffs contend that by using the language "said eight·
year period" the document is ambiguous and unintelligible.
The trial court found squarely against such contention. It
is to be observed by looking at the document that no questi:·
should exist, but that "said eight-year period"

cleatly~

unmistakably meant the term of eight years from the 15th da
of February, 1967.

It is true that the 'eight" in said para·

graph above the phrase just quoted above, had been lined

01;:

by a single line and a "ten" written above it and initiale<l
by Mr. Smith and Mr. Doxey, but such was and is clearly
legible and unmistakable.

The mere fact that the term of t
1

lease was extended to 10 years did not pro tanto mean that ·
the parties had to agree to a ten-year period for the optio:
to renew.

The allowing of the word "said" to precede the
I

eight-year period in the phrase relating to the right of rq
is not in any way fatal to the language of the Amendment tc
Lease nor creates an ambiguity therein.

Said "eight-year

period" is clear and unambiguous, and certainly is n~~
source of any patent ambiguity such as is asserted and cla::
by the plaintiffs-appellants in this case.
For the appellants to succeed in this matter, they rn~;.
show that it was the intent of both parties to the

proceed~)

that the renewal period should be three months prior
end of ten years instead of eight years, as state d

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1·n

tot~'.
the

amendment.

Assuming for the purpose of this brief that the

court appropriately allowed oral testimony to be admitted
relative to the intents of the parties, let us look at the
testimony that is in the record relating to the same.

Mr.

Doxey (R. 148-149), after the court sustained our objection
to an expression of his "understanding" regarding the renewal
clause, attempted to testify as to what the conversaions
were at that time.

He stated that "It's impossible to

remember the exact words that were said in the conversation.
So all I can tell you is there is no question about the fact
that the lease was extended and included in that extension
was the fact that renewal would be extended as well.

I can't

tell you the exact words that were said, but that's the
intent of the conversation."
as merely conclusion.

We moved that it be stricken

The court then asked him directly what

was his best recollection and he stated that "To the best of
my recollection, your Honor, the lease was extended from
eight to ten years, and the Notice of Renewal was also
extended."

Wherever Mr. Smith was asked about these same

matters (R. 255) he testified "When I presented the amendment
to Mr. Doxey he said that he understood it was ten years.
I said, 'Well, two years have expired.
Eight and two are ten.'
additional --

There's eight years.

He said, 'No, I would need an

I would need the term to be ten years.'

we made the changes at ten years."

And

And

Then counsel attempted
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to somehow impeach that testimony by saying that Mr. Doxe~,
and Mr. Smith were on "extremely friendly terms at the fr,·
which was denied by Mr. Smith, who stated that he had just
met the man, had never had any prior dealings with him, and
that this was not a casual thing but an actual statement,
and the only changes made were initialed by him and by Mr.
Doxey.
The record is clear that Mr. Doxey, the

brother-i~l~

of the plaintiffs-appellants, was an educator, a teacher ar.:
administrator and had served as a principal in the Granite
School District (R. 149-150).

He, as well as the plaintiffo,'

testified that they had read the Lease and the Amendment to
the Lease and had had no questions about it directed to the
defendant at any time, and Mr. Doxey had the lease in his
possession from the date in 1969 until his assignment and sa:
to his brothers-in-law (plaintiffs-appellants) in 1972, and
the plaintiffs-appellants had the lease from 1972 until the
time of its expiration in February of 1977.
The court has dealt with an ambiguity and change in
the language of a written contract a number of times.

one o'

the more recent decisions is Commercial Building Corpora~
v. Blair,

P.

~~-Utah,

2d

, regarding a

lease and the interpretations of the same as relating ~a
parking lot area.

There your courts said,

The rule in the State of Utah, as elsewhere,
is that parol evidence may be admitted to show the
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intent of the parties of the language of a written
contract is vague and uncertain.
On the other
hand, such evidence cannot be permitted to vary
or contradict the plain language of a contract.
There is nothing vague or uncertain in the
lease about whether Lots 25 through 30 are
committed to parking."
Plaintiffs-appellants in their brief seem to attempt
to boost their position on ambiguity by claiming that it is
a patent ambiguity, and quote the case of University Club v.
Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2nd 1, 504 P. 2d 29, and
apparently relying upon some theory that if the parties are
in sharp disagreement as to the meaning of the contract, that
it must be a patent case where the rule is that if there is
any uncertainty or ambiguity in the terms of the contract,
the court may allow extraneous evidence in order to determine
what was the true intent of the parties.

The problem the

plaintiffs have with this is that they must first show that
there was a real ambiguity, not merely that the parties at a
later date disagreed upon the terms and conditions of the
contract.

Such subsequent disagreement, wherein the plain-

tiffs in this case are trying to say that eight years means
ten years, is not the basis for the creation of a patent
ambiguity requiring the court to act.

Even if this were the

case, this court would have to find that the trial judge
who saw the witnesses and heard their testimony and observed
the demeanor of parties, was completely mistaken in his
ruling that the lease where it said eight years, meant eight
years and did not mean ten years, as to the right of renewal
-17-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

term.

In Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 26!,

501 P. 2d 266, the court allowed the introduction of para:
evidence to show circumstances under which the agreement.,
made and the purpose for which the instrument was executs:.
And in dealing with this, the court quoted from Bullough"
Sims, saying;
. that when parties place their own
construction on their agreement and so perform,
the court may consider this as persuasive evidence
of what their true intention was.
It is true that
the doctrine of practical construction may be
applied only when the contract is ambiguous; but
the question become ambiguous to whom? Where the
parties have demonstrated by their actions and
performance that to them the contract meant something quite different, the meaning and intent of
the parties should be enforced.
Let us look at the circumstances before us at the prt:'
time in this case,

At no time did the defendant, Smith

Investment Company, or its President, Reed M. Smith, say,c:
imply

anything inconsistent with the continuous position

that the right of renewal was limited to the eight-yell
period, from February, 1967.

When an attempt was made mor:

than a year after the expiration of said eight-year ~ri~
by the plaintiffs to exercise a renewal right, they were
clearly told that the time had passed.

There was no pracu::

construction by the defendant that would create either an
estoppel or a basis of ambiguity at any time whatsoever.
Had the initial words "eight years" that were

in the

·
Amen d ment to Lease as its
term never been wr 1-. t ten, then thi
1

phrase on the period of time for the exercise of the rio'. '
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of renewal "said eight-year period", might possibly be
construed as being ambiguous.

However, the document itself,

even after the single line through the "eight" and the
changing to "ten" on the terms of the lease, is clearly
legible and there can be no confusion or doubt as to what
this meant by the said eight-year period tagging the length
of time for the exercise of the right of renewal.

It is

to be recalled that the testimony of Mr. Doxey was that he
said that he needed a "term to be ten years", but at no time
asked for a change in the eight-year renewal notification
period on the amendment to lease as written and presented to
him.

Mr. Smith testified that he was reluctant in making

the change to the ten-year term, but that he did do it at
the request of Mr. Doxey (R. 256).

Plaintiffs would have the

court think that there is something magic in having the
period for the renewal coextensive with the term of the lease.
That was not the contract of the parties; those were not the
terms they agreed upon and that is not the language of the
Amendment to Lease upon which plaintiffs base their claim to
a renewal and extension of the lease.

As Mr. Smith testified,

there are a number of other tenants in the shopping area, and
reasonable management of the same dictated that he should know
Well in advance whether this lease was going to be extended
or not.

We submit that there is no patent ambiguity in the

document and that there is no occasion for oral testimony or
other evidence being admitted or considered competent to
-19-
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interpret the document itself.
POINT V.
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A BASIS
FOR REFORMATION OF THE LEASE OR AMENDMENT
TO LEASE.
POINT VI.
THE COURT SHOULD NOT REWRITE THE LEASE AND
AMENDMENT TO THE LEASE TO SATISFY PLAINTIFFS AND RELIEVE THEM FROM THEIR FAILURE
TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF INTENTION TO
RENEW.
Apparently in desperation, and realizing that there
truly was no ambiguity in the phrase giving an eight-year
period for the exercise of the right of renewal of the lea:'
plaintiffs seek to have the court reform the lease to con·
form with their wishes for a ten-year period for the exer·
cise of the right of renewal.

No fraud, no "mutual" mistake

of fact has been shown, and the trial court did not deem it
appropriate to attempt to reform and rewrite the contract
for the parties.

The basic reason for reformation of these

leases and like documents is mutual mistake of fact.

This

court on a number of instances said that the level of proo'
essential to establish a predicate upon which the court can·
make a reformation of the written document is "clear and
convincing proof."

See Naisbett v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 11 5,
32

307 P. 2d 620; and Janke v. Beckstead, 2 Utah 2d 247, 3
P.

2d 933.
No assertion is made that there was any misrepresenta'.:
-20-
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on the part of the defendant or its President, Mr. Smith,
nor any fraud, and as stated by this court in Jensen v. Manilla
corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Utah 2d,

~·

_ _ _ _P. 2d,

though parol evidence is permissible in an action for
reformation to show the writing did not conform to the intent
of the parties, when there is no evidence of any fraud or
misrepresentation on the part of the defendant nor any finding
of such as a basis for granting relief, no such relief will
be given.
We do not rewrite the contract, we merely allow
the writing to be made to conform to the contract
as made.
This court is not engaged in the rewriting of contract to
suit one party, particularly where that one party has had an
opportunity for many years to exercise a right of renewal
and has been so dilatory as to allow the time to pass and
then, without just cause or any other valid legal basis,
attempts to resurrect the lost right of renewal, no rule in
law or equity justified intervention of this court in the
redrafting of the contract to suit the plaintiffs-appellants
such as in this case.
Plaintiff, Mr. Lamar "Buzz" Winegar, testified that he
inspected the Lease and Amendment to Lease when he bought
out his brother-in-law, Doxey, in 1962.
(R.

He testified further

189) :
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Q.

Did you procure any written opinion from

any attorney as to this eight-year provision on

t~

right of renewal?
A.

Not a written opinion.

Q.

You did read the eight-year term in the

document on this renewal; did you not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And you have known of this ever since the

time you first negotiated the contract with your
brother-in-law?
A.

Yes.

This and other competent evidence in the record negati;,
completely plaintiffs' claims to ambiguity and claims for
reformation on the basis of mutual mistake.

This and othe!

competent evidence sustains the Findings of Fact and

t~

Judgment of the trial court.

DAMAGES
The plaintiffs, in addition to asking for reformation
of the Lease and the Amendment to Lease, are seeking damaai
for the failure of defendant to give consent to assignment
of the lease to a prospective buyer.

A review of dates wi:

aid the court in placing in perspective the situation of
the parties:
Nov.
Feb.
Jan.
Aug.

30, 1966
15, 1967
9, 1969
23, 1972

-

date of Lease
start of lease term
Amendment to Lease
Assignment by Doxey to plaintiffs
-22-
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Nov. 15, 1974

Last day for exercise of renewal
(3 months prior to end of eight years)
Aug. 20, 1976 - Notice of intent to renew mailed
Feb. 20, 1977 - end of lease term
Within the permitted option renewal period and on June
4 1 1976, Exhibit 2-P was written by plaintiffs to defendant.
This letter inquired about even another 5 years.
"If we exercise the renewal option

This reads,

(underscoring ours).

Mr. Winegar acknowledged that said exhibitwas not an exercise
of the option, but merely negotiation to see if yet another
five-year option could be added.

It seems significant that

plainitffs, within the designated eight-year period, started
to consider whether they should seek an extenion of the
lease.

The record does not show whether they then forgot

about it for two years, or merely had a change of mind.
It was in March of 1976 when plaintiffs notified defendant
of a contract to sell the car wash and asked for consent to
assignment.

Apparently plaintiffs had not disclosed to their

prospective purchaser that plaintiffs had not exercised the
already expired right of renewal within the stated time, and
that the lease would expire on February 15, 1977.
disclosure was not known to defendant.

This non-

So Mr. Smith wrote

that defendant would not withhold consent if the repair and
maintenance work, which should have been done earlier by
plaintiffs, were completed and the necessary financial statements be assignee were supplied.

At no time did the

prospective purchaser-assignee contact defendant concerning
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the lease provisions.

The terms of the prospective sale

by plaintiffs were never revealed to defendant (R. 171).
When Mr. Smith saw a real estate listing card which
referred to "gross sales of the car wash for the first
quarter 1976, amounting to nearly five thousand dollars",
he wrote to plaintiffs questioning such representations,,,
such did not conform with plaintiffs' lesser income report:
to defendant (R. 172).

Later, "Buzz" Winegar, one

oft~

defendants, testified that when he talked to other prosper·
tive purchasers of the car wash "and when they learned of
the terms of our lease they were no longer interested."
Plaintiffs did not deal directly with defendant,

b~

used a real tor, a Mr. Densley, who was not called by plaint
to testify.

The prospective buyer, Mr. Jensen, was called

and testified.

To reflect his uncertainty about the rene1a:

he said (R. 223) he became aware of the problem and though
it was not in the Uniform Real Estate Contract prepared bi
plaintiffs,
A.

Yes, this is the Uniform Real Estate Contrac:

which we signed at the time that we gave Mr. Winegar
the balance of the $5,000.00 down and agreed to pur·
chase it from him.

There was one stipulation.

don't think it's in here, though.

Q.

What was that?

A.

No, it's not stated in here.

Well, that he
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had to furnish me a lease from Mr. Smith for the
additional five years from February, which was when
the lease was -- as near as I can remember -- come
up for renewal.
And if he couldn't furnish me with this
additional lease, why, then he would refund all that
I had given him.
It was apparent that they both realized that the renewal
right had expired and that the plaintiffs "had to furnish
me a lease from Mr. Smith for the additional five years from
February."

Not once did Mr. Jensen contact Mr. Smith or

any other officer or representative of defendant (R. 228).
Q.

Now, this is in February and March and April

that you talked about in this deal; was it not?
A.

Right.

Q.

Now, you never called Mr. Smith and said to

Mr. Smith, "Has this been renewed," did you?
A.

No.

Q.

In fact you have never met Mr. Smith; have

A.

Correct.

you?

Damages, for loss of the sale to Mr. Jensen and refund
of the $5,000.00 down payment, resulted because no renewal
of the contract had been exercised by plaintiffs, and not
l::ecause of delay in consent.

The trial court turned down
-25-
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the plaintiffs' demands for damages.

Such decision was

supported by substantial competent evidence.

Even if thi:

court were to direct the trial court to re-write the Amen,j.
ment to Lease, it is not our understanding that retroacti'::
damages could be awarded.
In January, 1978 this Court again reaffirmed the
standards on appeal.

This was a lease interpretation case,

Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., January 30, 1978 In analyzing the plaintiff's contentions,
it is appropriate to have in mind these basic rules
of review on appeal:
that we indulge the findings an:
judgment of the trial court with a presumption of
validity and correctness; review the record int~
light favorable to them; do not disturb them if they
find substantial support in the evidence; and require
plaintiff to sustain the burden of showing error.
,
1

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, defendant-appellant urges that this appeal
be denied and that the decision of the trial court be affic·
Appellants have failed to show error on the part of the
trial judge.

No patent ambiguity exists calling for inter·

pretation of this eight-year period for exercise of the
renewal right.

No showing of fraud or mutual mistake has

appeared in the record to justify or require a reformatior.
of the Amendment to Lease.
proven in the circumstances.

No damages have been sustainec::
Plaintiffs, after lapse

0f

ti~

renewal option period, tried to sell the car wash to Mr.
fr"'
Jensen, but agreed to refund the down payment if a new ..
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__..I

year lease was not procured.

The plaintiffs' claim for

damages is predicated solely upon failure to consent to
assignment and such has not been proven because the requested
"consent" really involved a belated request for extension
of the lease.
Respectfully submitted this

2..{)

~h

day of April, 1978.

WATKISS & CAMPBELL

310 South
Salt Lake
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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